

ER 60-7309/a

30 SEP 1960

*✓, said*

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of

12 September 1960 and the enclosure thereto. Your interest  
in making this information available to us is indeed  
appreciated.

Sincerely,

**SIGNED**

Executive Officer

DDP/WH [ ] 1rh 26 Sep 60

Rewritten for JSE Signature: EO/DCI/ [ ] :blp 30 Sep 60

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - JSE

1 - ER ✓

2 - DD/P

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(Letter as originally prepared for DCI signature contained concurrences of [ ]  
of WH and [ ] for the DD/P.) (EXECUTIVE RESERVATION FILE)

**SECRET**

0-2-17  
[60-17436]  
SUBJECT

26 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA : Deputy Director (Plans) [redacted] 1950  
SUBJECT : Letter from [redacted] Covering  
his Proposed Solution to the Cuban Problem

25X1

25X1

Attached is a suggested reply for the Director's signature.

25X1

[redacted] letter and outline are attached.

25X1

[redacted]  
Acting Chief  
Western Hemisphere Division


Attachments:  
As Stated (3)

cc: DDCI  
DDP

**SECRET**

0-5012

11 346



This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 September, 1960 on the Cuban situation, enclosing your suggestions on a possible solution of the problem.

Your interest in the international problems of our country and the study and research you have devoted to this specific problem are indeed commendable.

Thank you for the helpful information you have provided us.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

cc:DDCI

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted signature box]

27 SEP 1960

Deputy Director (Plans)

DDP/WH [Redacted] rh (26 September 1960)

Originator:

[Redacted originator box]


DDP/WH

**Distribution:**

**Original and 1 - Addressee**

- 2 - DDP** *w/hold*
- 1 - C/OPS** *w/hold*
- 2 - Signers**
- 1 - C/WND**
- 3 - WE**

STAT



STAT

12 September 1960

Hon. Allen W. Dulles  
Chief, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles,

Inclosed you will find a proposed solution to the Cuban problem, which I hope you will find useful. I started working on it when I heard over the radio Mr. Krushchev's rocket rattling against the U.S.A. concerning Russian involvement in Cuba if force and armed intervention is used by the American government to change the Status Quo in Castroland. I felt ashamed that nothing has been done when something positive can be done about the Cuban situation and the communist tropical madman.

I can relax and continue sitting back and see the world go by as it is not my concern, but after second thoughts, America's survival is at stake and this is as much my concern as it is the President's.

I presume that me and my children will be better off by me keeping my mouth shut, than by sending you these papers, but I also remember that many people in Europe kept their mouth shut before the Second World War, and today they and their children are dead, killed by their own silence and unconcern, when a madman was rising in their midsts.

I am not a Cuban, I don't have any relatives residing in Cuba and there is not a single drop of Cuban blood in my veins. I am a native born American citizen that sees the danger America faces now and feel that I can contribute with a grain of sand to save what is not altogether lost.

This work has not been done at the spur of the moment, but after much thoughts and months of study and research. As you shall see I have divided my plan in four main sections that fall in four different categories, but that are closely related and each one is as important as the other.

The four main categories are:

- I. Political Offensive
- II. Economic Offensive
- III. Propaganda Offensive
- IV. Armed Intervention

I hope you will find my suggestions practical and workable for the benefit of our nation and the Latin American people.

Sincerely yours,

STAT

POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

A Cuban Government in Exile. The United States Government should do the utmost to help organize a Cuban Government in Exile. There are many prominent and intelligent Anti-Castro-anti-Communist Cuban citizens living in New York and Miami and other parts of the country that are exiles either from Batista or from Castro. If properly approached these people would gladly join an organization that will be aiming in toppling the Castro regime. There are many sincere intellectuals forming part of the militant White Rose movement, FAYCA (Fuerzas Armadas y Civiles Anti-Comunistas), Frente Humanista Cristiano, etc. which are definitely anti-Castro and anti-Batista and they can bring enormous prestige to a Cuban Government in Exile if it is formed.

Initiative. We should take the initiative to encourage and get together the leaders of these prominent Cuban organizations so that they meet to form this Government. We must take the initiative, because time is precious and none should be lost since we are running against time before a cunning enemy takes control of a large island 90 miles from our shores.

An agent or a functionary of the State Department should establish the necessary liaison with this organizations and an invitation should be issued to send delegates to a meeting (preferable at the Pan-American Building in Washington, D.C.) to elect this government in exile. After forming such government, the U.S. should back it up morally (by retiring "ipso facto" official recognition to the Castro regime), and recognizing the Cuban Government in Exile. Financial assistance should be given either by loans or direct contributions for administrative expenses. A Decent building should be allocated to the Government in Exile in another city far away from Washington preferable at Miami, Florida for two obvious reasons: First: The bulk of the Anti-Castro element in this country are living at the Miami-Tampa area and it

would be easier to keep in touch with those elements. Second: By having this Government functioning far way from Washington, it will keep most of the anti-American element in Latin America from calling this Government a puppet of the U.S. An agreement should be made between this Government and the U.S.'s as to the function, scope, limitations and purpose of said Government while at US soil and its aims in Cuba proper in a future post-Castro era.

Recognition. Recognition should be given to this Government as soon as possible. The recognition by other Latin American countries should be encouraged and after accomplishing such recognitions they will serve as yardstick to measure the Exile Government popularity throughout Latin America and the popularity it will gain in Cuba proper. Of course, the legitimacy of this government will be questioned by some countries, especially those forming part of the Sino-Soviet bloc, but Castro's government legitimacy is as questionable as was Batista's when he overthrew Prío Socarrás in 1952.

This is not a precedent in the annals of American diplomacy because we had recognized exiled governments in the past and we do in the present. During World War II we recognized the government in exile of Queen Wilhelmina in London, and we also recognized the Polish, Norwegian, Greek, etc. The Free French movement headed by De Gaulle was supported by us, nevertheless we recognized Hitler's puppet government in Vichy headed by Marshall Henri Petain and Pierre Laval. This government legitimacy was questioned then, nevertheless, we sent Admiral William D. Leahy as our first ambassador. Now-a-days we recognize the Taiwan government which is de-facto a government in exile.

Results. Much harm can be done to the Castro regime by setting up a government in exile. First: All the anti-Castro factions in this country and abroad will be united and headed by a strong centralized organization. Second: The Cuban people in the island will know that there is someone who is interested and care about their plight. Third: More people in Castroland will be inclined to seek refuge here, and

cially the young people, which are the ones that form the backbone of Castro's support and the ones that fill Raul Castro's Revolutionary Army. Fourth: We can control the movements and actions of these loose organizations to our advantage. Fifth: When a police action is required against Castroland, the government in Exile can provide the necessary manpower, since they can keep tabs on the Cubans living here.

Objective. The ultimate objective of this government is to help topple the Castro regime and take over the government in Cuba in a post-Castro era. This government should be democratic, definitely anti-communist and positively friendly to the U.S.

We should bear in mind that by destroying the Castro government we are doing a service not only to the Cuban and Latin American people but also to the American people as well, since the survival of our country is at stake right now in Cuba. Much has been said about the national purpose lately. Isn't this a part of that national purpose? Are we relegating our survival to the whimsical attitude of a bearded madman.

Russian "technicians" are swarming all over Castroland. Communist bases manned by Russians and Chinese Communist are being established. (See Exhibit #1) It won't be long when missile installations will have all our Eastern Seaboard (The hub and heart of the nation) pin pointed for destruction. Russian tankers and merchant ships are arriving at Havana. Will they become a Trojan horse German style? Like the German coal freighters that were lined up in the ports and fjords of Norway hours before the invasion of Norway in 9 April 1940?

Now Krushchev is coming for a visit to inspect his new domain and mutual security pact is planned. Raul Castro paved the way for the big day when Cuba will join the Varsovia Pact. Will his dream of dropping those atomic bombs in New York become a grim reality? By allowing Castro and his cohorts to cha-cha-cha with the Russians in front of our own nose, we are offering the Communists the future of our



nation in a gold platter. The foothold in this Hemisphere that the cunning Stalin always dreamed of, has been aquire effortlessly by the farmer from the steppes.

It is definitely known that the Castro government is Communist, not because in their plight the Cubans call him Castrovich or because of its communistic acts we condemn it, but by the admission of its leaders we know that this government is essentially and completely Communist (Exhibit #2). Also the "espaldarazo" given by Mr. K. himself when he had the gall to tell the world he'll send his rockets flying here if we intervene in the Cuban mess. Cuba today, what's next? Puerto Rico? (See Exhibit #8) or perhaps...Hawaii? It won't be long when his bladder will impulse him to intervene on even the treatment the Hutterites are receiving in the Dakotas. The situation in Cuba has gone from mala to malisima. It is up to us, and the whole of Latin America is watching, to apply the "mano fuerte" now!!!

We were more concerned about the Communist threat in Guatemala in 1954, than we are with the Communist government in power just 90 miles from our shores. We were more concerned with Guatemala in 1954 due to its proximity to the Panama Canal (more than 800 miles) than we are apparently with Castroland. Is the Panama Canal more important to us than the mainland. If the Panama Canal was worth saving in 1954 isn't our nation more than so in 1960? Castroland threat to our national security is worst than Guatemala's, not because of Cuba's proximity to our shores, but due to the worldwide appeal that Castro, Guevara, Jimenez, et al., had gain for themselves through the international Communist propaganda. It will take more than a Castillo Armas with his ragged army of 300 men and his two Piper Cubs from the United Fruit Company, to dislodge Castro from his entrenched position. If Castro was a Jacobo Arbenz, the blowing of "La Coubre" at Havana harbor or the explosion of the ammo depot a couple of months ago would have been enough to send him packing to Switzerland like the machine gunning of the oil tanks by the Piper Cub at Guatemala City sent Arbenz running. Unfortunately Castro and his henchmen were hardened at the Sierra Maestra. Incidentally, Jacobo Arbenz is back in this Hemisphere. He is

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Is he scheming a return to power?

mala? Were John Foster Dulles' effort in 1954 in vain?

The "abrazo" to the Castro's appeal for crude oil by such an influential man as the President of the Permanent Commission of the Mexican Congress, Emilio Sanchez Piedra, is one of the many signs the American people is expected to see throughout the future if bold action is not taken now. We must weight and take in consideration the effects of the Castro propaganda on the rest of Latin America. We can determine now what to expect from countries like Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and even Brazil (with Luis Carlos Prestes still in hiding) which have great nucleus of Communist within their borders, and which these weak governments can't or don't or dare antagonize.

If we owe to Juan Marinello and Lazaro Peña's perseverance and cunning the situation we face now in Cuba, we should bear in mind that like Cuba's Marinello and Mexico's Toledano, each country in the Caribbean, Central and South America has a well organized, devoted and fanatical group of Communists that are just waiting and watching how far their comrade Castro can go without being bothered by the fearful Big Stick of the Coloso Yanqui, to go themselves into action.

Some would said that an Ambassador is necessary in Castroland for this or that reason. As far as this is concerned Ambassador Bonsal's stay in Cuba is doing much harm to Bonsal's career and to the Department of State proper. The Cubans in Castroland sees the continue stay of Bonsal there as symbol of American ignorance of the internal affairs of Cuba. Diplomatically, the U.S. is giving a sort of prestige to the Castro regime by recognizing it as the legitimate government of Cuba. Diplomatic intelligenc in Cuba is as effective as it is in Soviet Russia. We have to be very candid to think that the D.I.E.R. men don't trail and does not have knowledge of all movements made by our embassy personnel there. Bonsal serve no purpose there. The Cuban people will prefer this move rather than see the representative of the great American nation being denigrated and aggravated in front of their own eyes. What

can they hope for if our nation is humiliated this way. Ambassador Lojendio did better...

On the other hand Cuban representatives in the Embassy<sup>have</sup> and the different consulates brazenly engaged in espionage activities in favor of Castro and Soviet Russia, thus adding more intelligent personnel to the Russian spying network. (See Exhibit #3).

The best time to break relations with the Castro government is NOW!!! We have had plenty of reasons to do so in the last months. Recall the Ambassador today show Castro we mean business. Name Bonsal Ambassador to the proposed Cuban Government in Exile. There is still time to save face, and I as a Latin can tell you that saving face means a lot in Latin America.

Castroland is a big menace to the United States. The Latin American countries recognize this fact (See Exhibit #4). Much time is lost at the OAS in discussions, polemics and motions while in the Cuban "manigua" the Cuban Alligator grows bigger in his smallness, brazen in his gestures and important in his defiance. Can we afford this?.....

II

ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

First Step. The first step toward an economic offensive has been taken by the U.S. when the Cuban sugar quota was sharply cut. This step should have been taken long time ago, for several obvious reasons: First: It would have prevented Castroland from winning hard currency during the crucial 1959, when the Cuban people was just beginning to digest him. Second: Unemployment in the sugar producing areas would have been so severe that it would have caused a grave crisis in his regime, possibly antagonizing the whole of the Cuban peasantry against him, for letting them go hungry during the 1959 "zafra".

Second Step. A complete boycott of all Cuban products should be put in effect. Actually this <sup>is</sup> nothing new, because we maintain such boycott against Communist China and in lesser degree with the other countries of the Communist bloc. We recently started one against the Dominican Republic. Cuba, by her aggressive and communistic antagonizing acts of their leaders has successfully qualified herself as the successful anti-Communist weapon. Great Britain has taken a more positive view against Castroland than the U.S. when a proposal by 50 members of the Parliament is under study to finish altogether the importation of the Cuban sugar and tobacco which amounts to 26 million dollars and \$1,400,000 respectively every year.

Likewise all exports to Castroland should be terminated and the same laws and regulations that are applied to the other Communist countries should be applied to Cuba because at this moment Cuba is a "de facto" a Communist country and falls within this economic criteria.

Castroland's screams because the U.S. has cut the Cuban sugar is a lot of hot wash. This country as a sovereign country, buys whatever it wants, to whomsoever it pleases and nobody is going to dictate or force this nation to buy what it does not want to buy, and it will not budge from this position by force, coercion, subterfuge,

and subterfuges. Nowadays this sort of thing is called by Castroland. "Interfering with the internal affairs of other nations". What name shall we give to this flagrant intervention of our economic affairs by Castroland against the U.S. Are we going to continue tolerating this barrage of diatribes in the U.N. and at the O.A.S.? Why we be candid when we can fight with logic?

III

PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE

FIRST ROUND. Up to now the Communist Government in Castroland is far ahead than ours in the war of words, this is so, because of the big headstart that Castro have had since he instituted the Prensa Latina scheme. He has been so successful with this agency that many Latin American governments do not dare officially criticize or condemn the Castro regime for fear of a counter offensive by the Castro propaganda machinery, which is already well entrenched in Latin America. The primary theme being of course, the "anti-yanquismo" (See Exhibit #5). So far Castro is winning this war of words because he cunningly took the offensive.

SECOND ROUND. There is a big pool of Cuban "intelligentsia" residing in this country that the U.S. seems to ignore or actually does not care to exploit it. Nearly all of them are either refugees from Castroland or have been disenchanted with Castro's behavior and are whole heartily anti-Castro. Luis Conte Arüero, a famous Cuban radio comentator which use to have a very popular program in Havana's CM. is the most widely known among them. These men can be used in setting up a daily broadcasting program beamed towards Cuba and used such program as a powerful weapon against Castroland.

Two men without hardly any means have started on their own one of these programs from Caracas, Venezuela and they have aroused Castro so much and their programs have had suchwide audience in Cuba and throughout Latin America, that they have rated for themselves an article in Castro's boot-licking "Bohemia". These men are: Antonio (Tony) Varona and Aureliano Sanchez Arango. Private enterprise has taken the initiative by setting up transmitters in Swan Island, off the coast of Central America. In these battles of words and people's minds we can do better than these two in Caracas and those at Swan Island due to our unlimited resources.

How it can be done. We should set up powerful transmitters at Miami, Tampa and New Orleans and start beaming the truth toward Cuba.   
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003700100012-0 or soon as practica-

ble, and practicable is...NOW!! As the Latin saying goes: One today is worth two tomorrows...

This transmitter or radio station should be runned by the proposed Government in Exile for two reasons: First: It will give the Government in Exile a worthwhile project in which to dedicate some useful and worthy time. We will also be giving this Government a chance to let the Cuban people in Castroland know its (the Government's) existence and the interest the Government in Exile takes in their plight. Second: Since Cubans know themselves each other better than anybody else, they can detect in their midst anybody or anything subtle that can be plugged in the transmission of the programs, so the transmissions won't go the way the "Voice of America" went, which was tinted and have communistic linings in their Latin American Broadcasts.

It is widely known that the Crusade for Freedom and other related successful anti-Communist programs are not Government controlled, nevertheless they are widely indorsed by the American Government in their fight against Communism in the Communist occupied countries of Eastern Europe. Why not set up the same scheme right here in America to fight a communist vassal 90 miles from our shores and just a few hundred miles from Washington? If the American Government recognizes the effectiveness of such methods by private enterprises why not ask for advice from the people that run this programs, or, if such advice is unnecessary, why not use their methods and put in effect this kind of programs to fight the adverse Castro propaganda against the U.S. which so many enemies had gained for us in Cuba, Latin America and throughout the world?

IV

ARMED INTERVENTION

World Opinion. Direct armed intervention by the U.S. in Cuba is faced by many peculiarities and problems, not because the U.S. does not have the capabilities of successfully performing such an operation, but it is mainly due to the world opinion about condemning such armed intervention, specially in Latin America where such an opinion and reaction will be the most perplexing. If the U.S. undertakes such an adventure it will encounter the same criticisms that the French and English encountered from the U.S. during the Anglo-French intervention in Suez in 1956. The same criticism and phraseology used by Mr. John F. Dulles that time will be expected by the U.S. from her allies. Nevertheless, armed intervention in Cuba is necessary, cannot be avoided and it will be the only means by which Castro can be ousted. Condemnation by the Organization of American States (which Castro alleges is an American tool designed to subjugate Latin America), breaking off of diplomatic relations, boycotts, economic sanctions, verbal diatribe, propaganda warfare, etc. are unnecessary skirmishes which may or may not help to the ultimate objective, i.e., getting rid of Castro, this things help, but they are not enough to budge Castro of his position. Cuba is definitely a Communist country, there is no way around it. We have more proofs and assurances of this fact than we had when we proclaimed that the government of Guatemala under Jacobo Arbenz was communist. Nevertheless, although we did not openly aided Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in his invasion of Guatemala from Honduras in June 1954, we encouraged and helped him in his undertaking.

Castro gained control of the Cuban government by means of force, and he will not get out unless force out, furthermore, no communist government that have been set up in any country in the world has been forced out by peaceful means. Not even



little and peaceful San Marino escaped this axiom. After they had voted in a Communist regime, and have tasted it for a while, they decided that it was not so tasty and they voted them out. Did they left as peacefully as they went in? No. They had to be chased out. Even the Italian "Carabinieri" had to be called and posted on the border ready for action against the well entrenched out-voted Communists.

It cost Spain three bloody years to get rid of the Communist government that had been set up in the country in 1936 by Manuel Azana and his Popular Front. Force was used in Guatemala and Greece, and it had to be used in Hungary with the unhappy results everybody knows. It should be pointed out that of all the nations that had shed out their Communist government all had done successfully so with outside help, only Hungary could not get rid of their Red government because she did not get outside help in her struggle. The only thing the Hungarian people got was sympathies, and apparently that was not enough. Not a single Communist country now in Europe, Africa (Guinea) and Asia will ever be anything else but Communist unless force and outside help is used to throw them out. It looks that the 1812 British cry of "Once an Englishman, always an Englishman" has a modern counterpart, "Once Communist, always Communist". It took a war to make the British change their minds. It will take force to make the Russians change their belief that they have Satan's devilish mission of converting the world to their ideology and that the countries they held captive must be enslaved forever. In 1812 the city of Washington was burned by the British, let's prevent the modern imitators do the same thing with their rockets, by ousting the tropical maniac and therefore taking away from the Russian the nearest launching pad from where this can happen. Let's do this before it is too late.

I hereby propose three plans by which this can be accomplish. In two of this plans the U.S. can intervene in Cuba without losing prestige in Latin America, before the eyes of our allies, and the rest of the world. Furthermore,

Russian intervention (if this is not a bluff) can be avoided. The other involve a little more risk but is worth taking if the other two are not soluble, because it is the most sound and the one with the most possibility of success.

First Plan. Since this is an "embrollo cubano" we should let the Cubans do some of the dirty work. We should form a special force which I shall call the "Cuban Brigade" formed by anti-Castro Cubans living in the U.S. and U.S. military personnel of Spanish ascendancy serving now with the armed forces which speak fluent Spanish (this is very important, as I shall explain later). They will form the hard core or the "cadre personnel" of the Brigade. In no moment I have mentioned the U.S. Marines. This is because of the sorry history the Marines have throughout Latin America. Much have been said about how, with the Marines help the customs and revenues of Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua improved during the Destroyer Diplomacy Era, but nearly nothing is heard of the ill feeling the Corps left throughout Latin America and specially in the countries where they intervened: Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Mexico (Veracruz, 1914) and the regimes they left behind after their intervention (i.e. The Trujillos and the Somozas). In Latin America; Marines, Imperialismo Yanqui, el Gran Garrote, El Coloso del Norte and the Imperialismo del Dolar are synonymous. To send the Marines to Cuba in force will be the easiest way of aligning all of Latin America to the Russian camp.

It would sound queer that U.S. military elements form part of a foreign body (the way I proposed it will not be foreign, but a part of the Army), but it is not impossible, by the same token, foreign personnel serve in our Army nowadays. i.e. the KATUSAS in Korea. In an emergency improvisations are necessary and this is definitely an emergency.

There are many militant Cuban organizations in the U.S. and abroad laboring for the overthrow of the Castro regime, among these are: F.A.Y.C.A., with 4,000 able bodied men in the New York and Miami areas; the Rosa Blanca (White Rose) hea-

ded by Rafael Diaz Balart and Major Diaz Lanz, ex-former Castro's Chief of the Air Force; Cuba Democratica, headed by Carlos Irigoyen; Movimiento Recuperacion Camilo Cienfuegos headed by Carlos Rodriguez, Frente Humanista Cristiano; the A.A.A.; Los Pinos Nuevos headed by Rafael Acosta, Asociacion Nacionalista Cubana, CCANY; Cruzada Institucionalista; Frente Revolucionario Democratico; and finally the Frente Democratico Cristiano headed by a five men junta which includes Dr. Ignacio Rasco Bermudez, Justo Carrillo, Manuel Antonio de Verona, Manuel Artine Bueso and Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, a Cuban with immense prestige in Cuba and abroad. Altogether, these organizations can muster from 15,000 to 20,000 able bodied men, most of them veterans against the Batista war machinery, men that we don't have to explain why they are fighting for.

The proposed Cuban Brigade should be trained under our own Army with our logistical, tactical and leadership support. This training should be given in some distant place far away from Miami, New York and Washington, so that its secrecy and objectives will not be compromised. Of course this Brigade should be operated under our Department of Defense through the Department of the Army. The Cuban Government in Exile should provide the necessary men conscripted through the different organizations but there his jurisdiction ends.

The best suitable place for this training should be at Camp Polk in Louisiana for three important reasons: First: Since this post is now deactivated and there is no Army personnel, with the exception of the caretakers, the men while training there will not arouse the suspicion of other Army personnel (by associating with them). Second: Since personnel involved would hardly speak any English they would not mingle with the local population and in that way they would not give out their mission. Third: The big port of New Orleans is the closest one to the Cuban Western Coast which is the most likely place for a good landing when the moment will be propitious. Fort Jackson in South Carolina

is a second good choice and Camp Tortuguero in Puerto Rico a third good one.

There is a great potential in the US Armed Forces that has been ignored by the Department of Defense. This great potential is the thousands of Puerto Rican officers and Non-Coms serving in the different branches of the Armed Forces. These men can be successfully used in this program. Most of these men are veterans of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. One of the most brilliant pages in American Arms was written by the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea and this regiment was composed mainly of Puerto Rican servicemen. There are still in the Army many efficient officers and non-coms that were in charge of the training program at Camp Tortuguero, Puerto Rico that trained the 65th Infantry replacements and since they know the language, customs and idiosyncrasy of the Cuban people they can train a Cuban Brigade as well as they did the Puerto Ricans.

This choice of Puerto Ricans cadre is good for two very important reasons: First: Since they have a common knowledge of the Spanish language and a thorough understanding of the Cuban psychology, they make the best training cadre for this force. Second: If needed be, the Puerto Ricans can and should accompany (since they form part of it) the Cuban Brigade in any forthcoming intervention against Castroland, and since their physiognomy are alike to the Cubans or for the matter like any other Latin American ethnic group, they would give the liberation movement a seal of purely "criollo" and the secrecy of this American undertaking have a better chance of going unrecognized by the rest of the world.

Hereby are the three plans:

First Plan. An expedition should be launched with no more than 500 men to conduct guerilla warfare at Pinar del Rio Province, or pretend to conduct this kind of warfare until the bulk of the Cuban Brigade can be brought sectionally to Cuba without arousing suspicion from the rest of the world, for a full scale operation against Castroland. If a Mc Arthur style invasion is used, there is always the risk of

of being condemned by the Latin American countries, the Bandung Conference countries and even some of the allies forming the NATO and the SEATO alliance: thus undermining these pacts and probably breaking with one stroke, what have been painstakingly built throughout the years.

This tactic of slowly raising the firepower of the troops without initially engaging them in full blast, is an old successfully Communist one, which was employed by the Chinese Communist in Korea and by Ho Chi Ming in Indochina. Have the Chinese intervened in Korea at full blast like the North Koreans did on 25 June 1950, the reaction against them would have been worst than the world reaction against Kim Il Sung.

This landing of 500 men should be made at Pinar del Rio province for these three important reasons: First: After Oriente province, Pinar del Rio is the most hilly province in Cuba and therefore is suitable for guerilla fighting. Second: Is nearer Havana than Oriente and the distance can certainly be shortened by a good porting force. Third: Oriente province is the happy hunting ground of Castro and his Revolutionary Army and they know every mountain, crevasse and stream in there. Furthermore every "guajiro" from Oriente is a potential informer (as the Captain Manuel Beaton affaire proved). On the other hand if liaison is established with the underground organizations now operating in Cuba, like "Do la Cruz" and the others still fighting against Castro in Oriente, diversionary tactics can be arranged so that the pressure against the men landed in Pinar del Rio can be lessened.

500 men is fair amount for a good guerilla force, because if less number is used it can be wiped out by Castro's henchmen in a short time, and a larger force of men would arouse suspicion of direct American armed intervention in the world and there is always the danger that the rest of the world would believe that a full swing invasion is either on the making or going on.

The initial mission of these 500 men will be to hold seizable trunks of land to

be used as bases for further operations, logistical support storage areas, construction of airplane landing strips, recruiting places, etc. A long tract of land with a big stretch of beach which can be used by landing crafts is a must if this operation is going to succeed.

The secondary mission will be to fight skirmishes with the Castro cohorts, and be used as decoys to get his attention off the places where new reinforcements are intermitently coming in, in preparation for a big push or a big scale offensive.

The primary mission of this Expeditionary Force, of course, will be the overthrow of Castro and his cohorts and the establishment of the Government in exile as the provisional government of Cuba, until free elections can be held preferably not later than twelve months after the downfall of Castro.

Second Plan. The second plan is similar to the first one, but instead of using Pinar del Rio as the initial target, we should use the Isle of Pines. The Isle of Pines with its 1,180 square miles is a good stepping stone and will make a good base of operations against Castroland. Its 75 miles long channel would prevent the practically non-existent Castro Navy (out of a strength of 400 officers, 240 were arrested by Castro himself in recent weeks) from taking an active part in a counter action against an expeditionary force there, besides this will make an excellent staging area for further big military operations against the Castro regime. It will be almost impossible for Castro to ship heavy armaments to the island to be used against us due to his lack of ships and more important the lack of competent men to operate such ships, furthermore, naval counteraction from Castro will be nil because most of Cuba navy-men are either in exile or rotting at La Cabaña.

I should be noted that Castro's firepower is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  stronger than Batista's ever was. His \$120,000,000 buying spree has made him the most powerful and therefore fearful maniac in the Caribbean. His, is the strongest army in Latin America with the doubtful exceptions of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. We should never underestimate this madman capabilities. This is why a well trained force should be used in Cuba. What

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in manpower we will balance it by the quality of

of our manpower and the strenght of our firepower.

Third Plan. The third plan is the one most likely to succeed in bringing Castro down. That is, an open invasion of Castroland by the Expeditionary force. The only trouble is that we may face a possible Russian retaliation and a sure world-wide condemnation of such an act. Even if we keep quiet and all secrecy is kept of the precedence, origin and objectives of such an operation, a worldwide Korean style reaction and a U.S.-Suez reaction and criticisms by our allies would be forthcoming. It is a gamble, but if needed be, we should take it. This are moments of bold action, hesitancy has not place in this fight against the Communist control of our backyard.

If open invasion is the choice, the landing should be in or near Matanzas, where its rolling fields make is as nice as the Russian steppes made it for the Panzers. Due to its proximity to Havana, I think 25,000 men can take Havana in less than one week if an open invation is performed at Matanzas. This is due largely because Castro's army is distributed throughout the island, especially in Oriente province where the army is fighting Crescencio Perez's band, Nino Diaz's company, Tamayo's group and the remnants of Capt Manuel Beaton's little army. By a landing at Matanzas, Havana can successfully be isolated from the rest of the island and with the capture of Havana, Cuba's capital, cultural center and national powerhouse, all organized resistance will cease, as it have been the case throughout Latin America, than when the capital is captured, the whole country gives in.

After Castro is overthrown, this is the time when the Department of State and the Cuban Government in Exile take over, for the good and for the better of Cuba and America.

NOTE: If any or all of my suggestions are worthy of consideration, I will like to add that I have workable scheme that definitely will solve the Cuban problem once and for all, without America loosing any prestige throughout the world. This scheme

can be successfully employed against the Somozas in Nicaragua and Stroessner in Paraguay, and possibly any future dictator the looms in the Latin American horizon.



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# HOW CASTRO PUSHES "HATE U.S." ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA

It's a Red-patterned, well-organized "hate U. S." campaign that Castro is conducting among U. S. neighbors to the south.

Chief vehicle: a "news" service to peddle the Castro line.

Investigation by "U. S. News & World Report" shows the scope of the operation, spreading throughout Latin America.

Reported from HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES

Fidel Castro's Government is waging the most ambitious campaign ever undertaken to turn all of Latin America against the United States.

It is a campaign that employs the Communist tactics of propaganda, intrigue and subversion, and it is making converts in a group of countries that traditionally have been friendly to the U. S.

In this pro-Communist, anti-U. S. offensive, Castro is employing these principal weapons:

- A "news" service, complete with bureaus, radio teletypewriters and a far-flung corps of correspondents.
- A radio network that utilizes 18 stations outside of Cuba.
- A flood of anti-American pamphlets and "news" releases distributed by Cuban diplomats and Castro's labor federation.
- Conspiracies by Castro's diplomats and secret agents, designed to stir up trouble for the U. S. and, in some cases, to overturn governments friendly to Washington.

**Editing the "news."** Spearhead of this offensive is Castro's "news" service, Agencia Prensa Latina—usually called Prensa Latina. Castro, irritated by the way U. S. news agencies reported his activities, discussed the problem a year ago with his chief "brain truster," Argentine-born Maj. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, and it was decided to establish an "independent" news service.

An Argentine friend of Guevara's, Jorge Ricardo Masetti, was hired to set up the operation. He was given an initial drawing account of \$325,000. Today, Prensa Latina is in the "news" business in a big way.

Nerve center of Prensa Latina is its Havana headquarters, which occupies an entire floor in the skyscraper Edificio Médico, or Medical Building. Here, dispatches radioed and cabled in by Prensa Latina's dozen bureaus and network of correspondents are screened and edited to bring out angles favorable to Castro and Communism and unfavorable to the U. S. Some stories are picked up from Cuban newspapers—which, with three exceptions, are pro-Castro. Items received from the Soviet Tass and other Communist agencies are translated into Spanish and Portuguese by a special section of 12 linguists.

All these items are blended into a "news" report that reads much like the line dispensed by Tass. It is sent by radio teletypewriters to Prensa Latina's bureaus for distribution to some 60 news-

## CASTRO'S WEAPON: LURID BOOKLETS ATTACKING U.S.

Here are samples of pamphlets, attacking and ridiculing the U. S., that are widely used in Cuba's propaganda campaign in Latin America. Publishing plants owned or subsidized by Castro's Government turn out hundreds of thousands of them for distribution through Cuban embassies and by groups of Communists and left-wingers. The covers frequently portray Mr. Eisenhower and Uncle Sam as villains or stupid clowns.



This is the cover of a pamphlet that parodies the Spanish-language edition of a U. S. magazine of the digest type. Mr. Eisenhower, in battle dress and holding a rifle, forces a Puerto Rican peasant to carry the American flag. The leading article, in a sarcastic vein, discusses at length the question whether the U. S., armed with hot dogs, can conquer Russia, armed with rockets.

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## HOW CASTRO PUSHES "HATE U. S."

announced that a high-powered station, under construction in Cuba, will carry the Castro-Communist message, in several languages, to the whole world.

The CTC, besides lending Radio Unión to the Castro cause, is engaged in propaganda activities on its own account. Every month, it mails two violently anti-U. S. magazines—"Vanguardia" and "Noticiero Sindical de la CTC"—to a long list of editors and labor leaders in Latin America. It also distributes "news" releases and some of the many anti-U. S. pamphlets now being published in Havana.

**Embassies—and espionage.** Cuban diplomats also are pushing Castro's anti-U. S., pro-Communist line throughout the world, with special attention to Latin America. Many of these are young firebrands without diplomatic experience who devote most of their time to distributing propaganda designed to show that the U. S. is the real enemy of Latin America.

Working closely with Communists and with Castro's secret agents, several Cuban diplomats have meddled in local affairs to the point where they have worn out their welcomes in their host countries. This was the case with Salvador Massip, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.

Massip, a boon companion of the Soviet Ambassador, was suspected by Mexican officials of receiving instruc-

tions from him. The Cuban Embassy issued false passports to Soviet and Czech agents to facilitate their travels in Latin America, Mexican sources said. A member of Massip's staff traveled secretly through Central America a few weeks ago, reportedly laying the groundwork for a series of revolutions intended to overturn governments friendly to the U. S. and replace them with governments oriented toward Havana and Moscow.

After finally falling into disfavor in Mexico, Massip was recalled and replaced by José A. Portuondo, described by anti-Castro newspapers as a Marxist.

Another ambassador who wore out his welcome was René Rayneri, in El Salvador. His pro-Communist activities were so flagrant that the Salvadoran Government asked for his recall. His successor is Francisco Pividal Padrón—a man whose pro-Communist meddling as Ambassador to Venezuela was so blatant that the Caracas Government declared him persona non grata.

In Guatemala, Ambassador Antonio Rodríguez narrowly avoided expulsion recently for similar activities. Neighboring Honduras expelled a Cuban diplomat, Víctor A. Mirabal Acebal, on February 16 for subversion and mixing into local politics.

In Colombia, Communists and other leftists staged an anti-U. S. demonstra-

tion on March 7 and distributed leaflets blaming the U. S. for the explosion of the French munitions ship *Le Coubre* in Havana harbor a few days earlier. Colombians believe the Cuban Ambassador, Adolfo Rodríguez de la Vega, inspired the demonstrations and the leaflets.

In Uruguay, the Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Legation instigated an attempt by university students to disrupt President Eisenhower's ride through Montevideo early in March. Cuba's Ambassador to Panama, José A. Cabrera, is trying to make common cause with the Panamanians in their difficulties with the U. S. over the Canal Zone.

**Coming: more troublemaking.** This is the pattern of propaganda, meddling and subversion that Cuban diplomats are following in Latin America. Now an increase in subversion is expected, as a result of the Havana Government's decision to assign a new officer, called a consular attaché, to each embassy. Each consular attaché, it is understood, will be an intelligence agent who will outrank the ambassador and will be well supplied with funds to finance subversion and agitation.

Castro's Government, thus, is going all-out to stir up trouble and turn the countries of Latin America against the United States.

## HANDBOOK FOR REVOLUTIONISTS—BY CUBA'S ECONOMIC CZAR



**B**EST-SELLING BOOK in Latin America, if Fidel Castro of Cuba has his way, will soon be a 187-page item called "La Guerra de Guerrillas"—"Guerrilla Warfare."

The author is Cuba's No. 2 leader, Maj. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, Communist-trained Argentine who heads Cuba's National Bank.

The book, published in April by the Castro Government's Institute of Agrarian Reform, tells Latin Americans how to overthrow their governments, take power and keep it.

In simple language, Guevara explains how 20 armed men can break

up a column of thousands. He explains how to use terrorism, sabotage and seizure of private property as instruments of war. He tells how to fight guerrilla warfare in cities and suburban areas.

The U. S., says Guevara, wants to liquidate Castro's regime, but doesn't know how. Castro can get economic help from "Egypt . . . the Soviet Union . . . perhaps Iraq."

First edition of Guevara's book is sold out. But, said a Castro official in Havana recently: "There will be many more editions—in many languages."

The author: Maj. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara



papers and a number of radio stations in Latin America.

**Portrait of U. S.** On a typical day, this "news" report contains stories under headings such as these: "Student leaders of Latin America visit Red China"; "Mexico criticizes U. S. policy on corn exports"; "Youth problems in New York"; "How Soviet Russia brings prosperity to East Germany"; "Brazilian state government criticizes contract with American power company"; "Land reform in Cuba"; "Castro proclaims press freedom in Cuba"; "Poland wants to help underdeveloped countries of Latin America"; "Panama plans new moves against U. S. imperialism"; "Hungary boosts output of consumer goods."

When Senator John F. Kennedy, campaigning for the U. S. presidential nomination, declared recently that 17 million North Americans go to bed hungry every night, Prensa Latina grabbed the item, and it got quite a play in Latin America. "Revolución," Castro's semiofficial mouthpiece in Havana, headlined the story: "The myth of prosperity in the United States."

For Communist, leftist and ultranationalist editors, Prensa Latina is an invaluable aid. It provides them with ammunition to use in discrediting the U. S. while picturing the Castro-Communist tie-up as an ideal partnership for progress.

**The Red slant.** Most of the members of Prensa Latina's staff are old hands at

spotting stories that can be given an anti-U. S. twist. Masetti had years of experience with a similar service financed by dictator Juan D. Perón of Argentina.

Many other members of the staff are fellow travelers or Communists. Still others are leftist-nationalists who favor neutralism.

Now, some of these nationalists are turning sour on Prensa Latina, for they find that what they expected to be a genuine news agency is merely a propaganda arm of the Cuban Government. In protest, Paul de Castro, a Brazilian, has resigned a responsible position with the agency.

De Castro, as head of the Prensa Latina bureau in Rio de Janeiro, became disillusioned with the organization and the kind of "news" it was handling. He became aware, also, that his office was being used as an espionage center.

"The directors of Prensa Latina," De Castro said, "are men of totalitarian backgrounds, regarding the U. S. with a blind hate due to the Peronist and Stalinist backgrounds they share. Cuba is their only concern, and Latin America is so only to the extent that it serves the interests of Cuba. Little by little, it became evident to me that this was a Cuban agency serving the Government itself."

"If one may judge by Prensa Latina," he added, "the Cuban revolution has taken a grave turn toward a police state,

with tyranny and indifference to truth as its method and system."

**Who pays the bills?** Prensa Latina's operating expenses are estimated by news-service men to run from \$150,000 to \$200,000 a month, at a minimum. It is not clear where much of the money comes from. Revenue from the sale of the service is negligible, for most clients receive it free. The Cuban Government is believed to pick up \$60,000 of the tab each month. Some believe the rest of the money comes from a source behind the Iron Curtain.

Prensa Latina has its radio counterpart in a newly established network called Cadena Latinoamericana—Latin-American Chain. Key station of the chain is Radio Unión, in Havana, owned by the Cuban Confederation of Labor—CTC—and staffed principally by Communists and fellow travelers.

Radio Unión broadcasts each night by short wave to two relay stations—one in Venezuela and one in Argentina. The programs are rebroadcast to 16 stations in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Billed as "news," the programs consist of propaganda. Among their listeners are millions of Latin Americans who do not read newspapers.

These broadcasts, now beamed only to Latin America, are soon to be extended. The Government in Havana has


(continued on page 74)



A sinister Uncle Sam is lurking in the background on the cover of this booklet, entitled "\$abotaje." Inside is Castro's address blaming the U. S. for explosion of French ship *La Coubre* in Havana harbor.



This booklet charges U. S. blew up battleship *Maine* as a pretext for entering Cuba's war against Spain, in 1898. Similarly, U. S. is charged with blowing up the munitions-carrying *La Coubre* on March 4.



Here a greedy, diabolical Uncle Sam prepares to seize Cuba in his claws. Text charges Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood—"big, ruddy, strong, brutal"—as Cuba's military governor rigged the first election, in 1901.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, WH Division		
2			
3	<i>c/wh</i>	<i>[initials]</i>	
4			21 SEP 1960
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

For your information and preparation  
of an appropriate reply

*1 Copy retained in  
O/OOP*

SUSPENSE: 27 September 1960

**FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER**

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Asst. to the DCI	9/19/60

UNCLASSIFIED

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ INTERNAL

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☐ SECRET

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO.

Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

6 September 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

C / WHD

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

1.

Deputy Director (Plans)

2.

3.

Director of Central Intelligence

4.

5.

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*Suspense*  
*27 Sept*

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FORM  
1 DEC 56

610

USE PREVIOUS  
EDITIONS

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☐ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED